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participatory research plays an important role. The associated organizations have established 
long-term active collaboration with farmers, producers, consumers and research networks. RSR 
also represents a seed network including different stakeholders. This presentation will share 
experiences from RSR related to the construction of such a seed exchange network and will offer 
suggestions for improving the functioning and structure of this kind of network. More and more 
processes have been actively addressing the development and strengthening of social systems 
related to seeds. The emergence of new informal seed systems and the sustainable use of 
agricultural biodiversity are closely connected to the emergence of new social relationships. The 
heterogeneous membership of RSR facilitates the connection and partnership of social actors and 
encourages the emergence of informal seed systems. 
 
Key words: agricultural biodiversity, conservation, informal seed systems, institutions, seed 
network 
 
 
Incentive mechanisms to conserve agricultural diversity 
for private and public benefit, communities' livelihoods, 
climate-change adaptation and other ecosystem services 
 
Adam Drucker 
 
Bioversity International (Italy) 
 
A fundamental conundrum is experienced in most developing countries today: How to safeguard 
the biodiversity maintained in the fields of the rural poor—which constitutes a national and global 
good for adapting to climate change and maintaining future options, food security and ecosystem 
health—whilst meeting those same people's development needs and rights? As many of the 
benefits of agricultural biodiversity management are public goods, markets alone are limited in the 
extent to which they can adequately reward farmers for managing levels of diversity needed by 
society. This has led to a call for the development of positive incentive schemes being specifically 
mentioned by the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Strategic Plan for 2011–2020, Aichi Target 
3. 
 
While value chain development can facilitate the maintenance of threatened genetic resources, 
such a strategy has limitations in how much it can achieve. Challenges include a tendency to focus 
on a narrow range of traditional crop species with high market potential but not particularly at risk, 
high initial investment costs and uncertain long-term success rates, as well as displacement of 
other threatened genetic resources where successful.  
 
A recently tested innovative solution to the public good provision dilemma is implementing 
‘rewards/compensation for agricultural biodiversity conservation services’ (PACS) incentive 
schemes. Through the use of competitive tenders and in-kind, community-level rewards, these 
schemes have been shown to be a potentially effective complementary instrument for promoting 
the cost-effective maintenance of threatened genetic resources. They are capable of building on 
(rather than undermining) existing pro-social collective behaviour, as well as accounting for 
participatory justice and social equity considerations – such as facilitating the participation of 
women, poor and younger farmers. Up-scaling nevertheless requires urgent consideration of 
accompanying prioritization protocols (“what to conserve?”), conservation goal setting (“how 
much to conserve?”), participatory monitoring schemes and identification of agricultural 
biodiversity-relevant ecosystem service indicators (including climate change adaptation and 
nutrition), as well as the establishment of a funding dialogue with potential private and public sector 
service purchasers and beneficiaries.  
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